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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Randy Darn is Washington's Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
a nonpartisan elected state officer whose constitutional duty is to "have 
supervision over all matters pertaining to public schools." Canst. art. III, 
§ 22. As the State's chief school officer, the Superintendent plays a unique 
role. He is the sole statewide elected official col).stitutionally tesponsible for 
supervising public education, and he heads up Washington's state educ'J,tion 
agency, the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction ("OSPI"). 
By letter dated March 2, 2 0 16, Deputy Conunissioner Wal te.r Burton 
informed the Supelintendent that the Chief Justice granted his motion to file 
this brief. 
ISSUES 
1. This Court held the State in contempt for failure to comply 
with the Court's Order dated January 9, 2014. Were the actions of the 2016 
Legislature sufficient to purge the contempt? 
2. If the actions of the 2016 Legislature were not sufficient to 




A. The 2016 Legislatul'e's Action To Address McCleary Did Not 
Purge This Court's Ol'der of Contempt 
The first issue is whether the 2016 Legislature's actions to address 
McCleary were sufficient to purge the order of contempt entered against the 
State of Washington and vacate the one hul)dred thousand dollar ($1 OOlOOO) 
per day remedial penalty imposed by the Court. The answer is no. 
The State points to the Legislature's accomplislunents in the. areas 
of stu<;lent transportation; materials, supplies, and operating costs, ali-day 
kindergarten! and K-3 class size. See State of Washington's Memorandum 
Transmitting the Legislature's 2016 Post-Budget Report and Requesting the 
Lifting OfContempt and the End Of Sanctions at 17~18 (May 18, 2016). 
However, these were the accomplishments of the 2015 Legislature. ·Despite 
the progress in 2015, the Legislature did not address significant staffing 
needs, compensation needs, excess levy reform, and basic education 
funding from a regular and dependable source. See Amicus Br. of Supt. Of 
Pub!. Inst. at 4-15 (July 28, 2015) ("2015 Amicus Br."). And this Court 
round the actions of the 2015 Legislature insufficient and imposed the 
$100,000 a day remedial penalty. Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 
at 9 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) ("2015 Order"). 
2 
.,, 
The 2016 Legislature made no progress to address the deficiencies 
identified by the Court in 2015. The 2016 Legislatw·e's main 
accomplishment was the passage of E2SSB 6195 (Laws of 2016, ch. 3), 
which is nothing more than a plan to plan, E2SSB 6195 establishes an 
education funding task force. E2SSB 6195 § 2. The purpose of the task 
force is to "continue the work of the governor's infonnal working group to 
review data and analysis provided the consultant [and] make 
recommendations to the Legislature on implementing the program of basic 
education as defined in statute." E2SSB § 2(1). 
The problem is that when the Legislature defined basic education in 
ESHB 2261 (Laws of 2009, ch. 548), it recognized the need to provide 
students with "world~class educators[.f ESHB 2261 § 601(1). And so the 
Legislature directed the Office of Financial Management ("OFM") to 
"convene a technical worldng group to recommend the details of an 
enhanced salary allocation[.]" The Compensation Technical Working 
Group Final Report was issued on June 30, 2012. The problem is not a lack 
ofinfonnation; it is the lack of political will to use the information. Instead 
of solving the problem, the 2016 Legislature kicked the can down the road 
and appointed another task force. The Court should not purge the order of 
contempt against the state or vacate the remedial penalty. 
3 
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B. The Remedial Penalty Is Insufficient To Coe1·ce The Legislature 
Into Complying With McCleary 
''Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper 
case, be employed for either or both of two purposes; to coerce the 
defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the 
complainant for losses sustained." United States v. United Mine Workers 
of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04l 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947). When the purpose 
of the sanction is to coerce compliance, the Court "must then consider the 
character and magnitude of the hann threatened by continued contumacy, 
and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about 
the result desired.'' Jd. at 304. The remedial penalty imposed on the State 
is completely ineffective. 
In the usual situation, an individual held in contempt is subject to a 
monetary penalty or imprisonment to coerce compliance. This kind of 
pressure on an individual is usually effective. The situation is completely 
different when the Court holds the State of Washington in contempt. To 
comply with this Court's order in McCleary, a majority of the members of 
the House and Senate must agree. To coerce compliance, a penalty must 
put pressure on individual legislators, and/or motivate the legislators' 
constituents to demand that legislators solve the problem. 
4 
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A remedial penaltyof$100,000 a day sounds like a lot ofmoney. 
But the Legislature does not take it seriously. The Court's 2015 Order 
imposing the penalty provided if "the legislature hold[s] a special session 
and during that session fully compl[ies} with the court's order, the court will 
vacate any penalties accruing during the session." 2015 Order at 9. The 
Legislature did not hold a special session in 2015 &nd did not make progress 
in the 2016 regular session. 
The order provides that the "penalty shall be payable daily to be held 
in a segregated account for the benefit of basic education." 2015 Order at 
9-10. But the Legislature has not bothered to appropliate the funds to pay 
the penalty. See 2016 Report to the Washington Supreme Court by the Joint 
Select. Committee on Article IX Litigation, 64th Wash. Leg., at 27 . So the 
only coercive power of the penalty is that OFM "is computing the 
accumulated amount of the sanction on a daily basis and submitting weekly 
reports to the Legislature and the State Treasm·er.'' ld. 
In E2SSB 6195, the Legislature promises to solve the problem-· 
stating its intent that the '~state is fully committed to ftmding its program of 
basic education as defined in the statute[.]" B2SSB 6195 § 1. In 
considering the Courfs power to fashion conditions to purge contempt, the 
Court of Appeals observed that a "contemnor's promise of compliance is 
the first step. But where that promise is demonstrably unreliable, the court 
5 
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can insist on more than mere words of promise as a means of pm·ging 
contempt. To conclude otherwise would render the statutes unenforceable 
and reduce the court to the level of beggar." In re MB., 101 Wn. App. 425, 
448~ 3 P.3d 780 (2000) (emphasis added). 
Fully funding basic education is a very complex political and policy 
problem that the Legislature must treat with real urgency. The Court cannot 
simply rely on the Legislature's promise. The Legislature must act. More 
effective sanctions are required for the Legislature to have the political will 
to solve the problem. 
C. The Court Should Impose One Or More Of the Following 
Sanctions To Coerce Compliance With McCleary 
1. Individual Legislators Could Be Held Ill Contempt And 
Subject To A Remedial Penalty 
RCW 7.21.030(1) provides in part that the "court may initiate a 
proceeding to impose a remedial sanction on its own motion [and] after 
notice and hearing, may impose a remedial sanction authorized by this 
chapter." Contempt of court includes "[d]isobedience of any lawful 
judgment, decree, order, or process of the court." RCW 7.21.01 O(l)(b). 
The statute authorizes a remedial sanction 11not to exceed two thousand 
dollars for each day the contempt of court continues." RCW 7.21.030(2)(b ). 
A coercive contempt order "must contain a purging clause." State v. 
Boatman, 104 Wn.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985). The Court has 
6 
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"inherent power ... to hold a person in contempt ... to enforce Ol'dets or 
judgments[.]" Id. HBefore the inherent power of the court can be used, the 
court must dete1mine that reliance on the statutory basis would be 
ii1adequate." Jd. 
The contempt order issued by the Court in 2014 was against the 
State of Washington~ not the Legislature or individual legislators. The 
Court should consider such a sanction now. 
The fact that the defendant in McClecuy v. State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 
269 P .3d 227 (20 12), is the State of Washington, not the Legislature, does 
not matter. The Court's contempt power is not limited to the named 
defendants in a case. 
For example, in Delorme v. Int. Bartenders' Union, 18 Wn.2d 444, 
446, 139 P.2d 619 (1943), the trial com1 enjoined fue "International 
Bartenders; Union Local624 together with all their members, officers and 
agents ... from picketing, boycotting, or in any manner interfering with the 
plaintiff's place of business[.]" Latet, the plaintiff moved for contempt 
sanctions against the Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and 
Helpers, Yakima, W;'lshington, Local No. 524, for picketing the business. 
The Teamsters argued Hfh.at, because neither they, individually, nor 
the union to which they belonged were parties to the original suit, [they] 
may not be brought into the case subsequent to the entry of the decree by an 
7 
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order to show cause[.]" Delorme, 18 W n;2d at 453. The Court rejected this 
argument. The Teamsters "demonstrated that they [were] motivated by a 
unity of purpose with the ... bartenders local union, one of the defendants 
in the action." Delorme, 48 Wn.2d at 454. The Teamsters were "so tied in 
with the acts of the original defendants in the action as to demonstrate that 
they have been carried on in cormection with a plan to interfere with the 
conduct of respondent's business, to his detriment." Id. "[T]he trial court 
properly held that they had intentionally and knowingly violated the decree, 
and stood in contempt of court." I d. 
Similarly, the Legislature is at the heart of complying with the 
Courfs McCleary order. The Court has the authority to find individual 
legislators in contempt. If the Court chooses this sanction, it should require 
every individual legislator to pay periodic penalties, subject to receiving a 
refund if the Legislature purges the contempt order by satisfactorily 
addressing McCleary. 1 
1 A remedial penalty Imposed against members of the Legislature must be 
narrowly designed to compel members to take the necessary actions to ensure that K-12 
education is fully funded by 2018. To. that end, the penalty could ·be temporarily stayed 
when tnetnbet:S are taking meaningful steps to solve the problem. For example, if the 
Legislature goes into a ::;pecial session before the Novembt~t election for the purpo.se of 
meeting its constitutional obligations under McClewy, individual remedial sanctions 
should not be imposed while the members meet. Alternatively, individual sanctions should 
be stayed during any period in which newly elected members participate in work sessions 
with key legislators and staff educating them on their McCleary duties. The contempt of 
an iudividuallegislator would be purged once he or she left office. State v. Wallace, 96 
Wash. 107, 109, 164 P. 741 (1917). 
8 
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It does little good to have OFM simply total up the amount of such 
penalties.2 
2. Tile Court .Could Enjoin The Payment Of Special Levy 
Funds To School Districts 
Holding legislators in contempt and imposing a remedial penalty is 
a remedy designed to coerce individual legislators directly. The next four 
options are designed to coerce legislators, through political pressure from 
their voters, to comply with the Courtls order in McCleary. 
One option is to enjoin the payment of special levy funds to school 
districts. 
Special levies are authorized by the voters of the local school 
districts. RCW 84.52.053. However; RCW 28A.510.270 provides that the 
''county treasurer of each county of this state shall be ex officio treasurer of 
the several school districts of their respective counties[.]" "One of the 
duties of the county treasurer is to Hreceive and hold all moneys belonging 
to such school districts, and to pay them only for legally authorized 
obligations of the district." RCW 28A.510.270(1). The county treasurers 
collect tax levies, and then allocate and distribute the taxes to the respective 
school districts. See RCW 84.56.230. 
2 If the Court elects this sanction, it might consider a limited remand to the trial 
court so that the penalties could be paid into the registry of the superior court pursuant to 
CR 67. Cf. RAP 7.2(c) (the trial court has the authority to enforce judgments); RAP 8.3 
(authorizing appe:llate courts to issu~ orders to ensure effective and equitable review). 
9 
If the Legislature does not purge the contempt against the State by a 
certain date (e.g.~ January 1, 2017), the Court could enjoin county treasurers 
from making those special levy distributions to the local school districts. 3 
Such an injunction has a direct nexus to the case~ In McCleary, this 
Court stated that: "The trial court concluded that the State has failed to 
adequately fund the education required by article IX, section 1 ." Substantial 
evidence supports this conclusion, McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 529. The Court 
concluded that the '~he State has consistently failed to provide adequate 
funding for the program of basic educatimt, including funding for essential 
operational costs such as utilities and transportation [and that], local 
districts have been forced to tmn increasingly to excess levies[.]" Jd, 
The State violated article IX, § 1 by failing to fund basic education; 
but local school districts also acted impr.operly by using special levies to 
pay for basic education. Because districts are using special excess levies to 
pay for basic education, and because the use of levies for basic education 
violates the constitution, the Court should enjoin the distribution of excess 
levy dollars until the Legislature has a plan in place to fully fund K-
12 education with state dollars. Such an order would cause school distdcts 
3 The injunction would only prohibit the treasurer from distributiJ~g the levy 
proceeds. It would not prohibit school districts from putting a special levy on the ballot or 
counties from collecting the levy. That way, ifthe contempt is purged, school districts will 
have access to their special levy taxes. 
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and the public to immediately demand legislators to provide adequate state 
funding. 
The Court has the authority to issue an injunction to county 
treasurers. Under RCW 7.21.030(2)(d), the Coutt may impose "[a]ny other 
remedial sanction other than the sanctions specified in (a) through (c) ofthis 
subsection if the CoUit expressly finds that those sanctions would be 
ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court." fu addition, "the 
courts retain all the equitable powers inherent in them, and may still exercise 
them when the occasion demands it." O'Brien v. Johnson, 32 Wn.2d 404, 
407, 202 P.2d 248 (1949) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). As 
with contempt, the Court's injunctive power is not limited to parties. 1"To 
render a person amenable to an injunction it is not necessary that they should 
have been a party to the suit, so long as they had actual notice of the contents 
of such injunction." State v. Wallace, 114 Wash. 692, 693-4, 195 P. 1049 
(1921) (citation and intemal punctuation omitted). 
3. The Court Could Enjoin The Operation Of Certain State 
Tax Credits And Exemptions 
Another option to put pressure on the Legislature is to enjoin the 
operation of certain state tax exemptionsj credits~ and preferential tax rates. 
McCleary was decided in January 2012. During the legislative sessions in 
2013, 2014, and 2015, the Legislature enacted 39 tax exemptions, credits, 
11 
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and preferential rates. 2016 Tax Exemption Study, Introduction and 
Summary of Findings, Table 5> at 1 "8.4 Enjoining tax exemptions, credits, 
and preferential rates will put a different kind of pressure on the Legislature 
than cutting off special levy funds; and the pressure would likely come from 
both large and small taxpayers. 
For example, in 2013 the Legislature enacted ESSB 5952 (Laws of 
2013, 3rd Spec. Sess. ch. 2). This law purported to "[i]ncentiviz[e] a long-
tenn commitment to maintain and grow jobs in the aerospace industry in 
Washington state by extending- the expiration date of aerospace tax 
preferences and expanding the sales and use tax exemptions for the 
construction of new facilities used to manufacture superefficient 
airplanes[.]" Final Bill Report on ESSB 5952 at 1, 63rd Spec, Sess. (2013). 
Among other things, ESSE 5952 reduced the business and 
occupation tax. ("B&O") for the manufacture of commercial airplanes from 
0.484 percent to 0.2904 percent> and it reduced the service and other 
activities B&O tax. for taxpayers with qualified aerospace product 
development for other entities from 1.5 percent to 0.9 percent. See 
Department of Revenue Fiscal Note to S.B. 5952 at 2 (Nov. 7, 2013). 
4See http:/ /dor. wa. gov/content/aboutus/statisticsandreports/20 16/ 
Tax:_Exemptions_2016/Default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2016). 
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The Department of Revenue estimated that the impact of SB 5952 
would be greater than $50,000 per fiscal year in that biennium. Jd. at 1, It 
was no doubt·substantially higher than that. 
Sometimes the Legislature enacts a single law that contains a 
number of srnall exemptions or credits. For example, in 2013, the 
Legislature passed ESSB 5882 (Laws of 2013, 2nd Spec. Sess. ch. 13), 
which set a number ofB&O tax and sales and use tax exemptions. Among 
many other things~ the law exempted from the state sales tax «clay targets 
purchased by a nonprofit gun club for use in providing the activity of clay 
target shooting for a fee." ESSB 5882 § 402. The clay targets were also 
exempted from the state use tax. ld. at§ 403. While the fiscal impact of the 
clay target exemption may have been small, the aggregate impact ofESSB 
5882's individual exemptions has surely been significant. 
If the Court chooses this option, it is important to know which tax 
exemptions, credits, and preferential rates to enjoin. The injunction should 
have some nexus to the case. Prior to the Court's McCleary decision in 
January 2012l the case was on appeal and it was not certain that this Court 
would conclude the State was violating article IX, § 1. However, after the 
Court issued its July 18, 2012, order maintaining continuing jurisdiction, 
the Legislature was on notice that complying with McClemy took priority 
over new tax exemptions, credits, and preferential rates. TI1e Legislature 
13 
nevertheless enacted new tax breaks. See 2013 Final Legislative Report at 
298·303 (W~sh. July 23, 2013), 2014 Final Legislative Report at 193~196 
(Wash. Apr. 22, 2014), and 2015 Final Legislative Report at 311~317 
(Wash. Sept. 28, 2015). 
TI1e Court can enjoin the operation of B&O and state sales and use 
tax exemptions, credits, and preferential rates enacted after 2013, and order 
the Department of Revenue to disallow any of the enjoined t::tx breaks that 
appear on tax returns filed with the Department. 5 
The order should also require the Deprntment to identify all B&O 
and state sales and use tax exemptions, and prefet~ential rates enacted after 
2013. The Court has the authority to issue "mandatory injunctions [fuat] 
compel[] the performance of some affirmative act." 15 Karl B. Tegland, 
Washinh»!On Practice: Civl.l Procedure § 44:3, at 236 (2"d ed. 2009). Of 
course, if the injunction succeeds in getting large and small taxpayers to put 
pressure on the Legislature to comply with McCleary, it would be dissolved 
5 If the Court chooses this option it should focus on the B&O and stale sales and 
use tax·. Those two taxes, along with tho state property tax, form the largest dollar 
amount of exemptions. See 2016 Tax Exemption Study, Introduction and Summmy of 
Findings, Chart 1, at 1-3; 
http://dor.wa.gov/docsJreports/2016/Tax_Exernption_Study_2016/0l_Intro_and_Summar 
y_of..f'indings.pdf. Since the property tax is collected by county treasurer, not the 




and taxpayers could then file amended tax returns to take advantage of the 
exemptions and credits provided under statute. 
4. The Court Could Enjoin The Expenditure Of Non-
Education State Funds That Are Not Constitutionally 
Required Or Otherwise Necessary 
The Superintendent's prior amicus curiae briefs urged the Court to 
enjoin state spending of non-education state funds that are not 
constitutionally required or necessary to preserve the health and safety of 
the citizens of Washington. See Amicus Br. of Supt. Of Publ. Inst. at 11-12 
(Aug., 4 2014) ("2014 Amicus Br/'); 2015 Amicus Br. at 19·20. 
The question is how to identify the spending to be enjoined. In 2015, 
OFM issued a dire.ctive requiring agencies to conduct contingency planning 
for a partial shutdown of state government in case the Legislature failed to 
adopt an operating budget. Agencies were directed to divide their spending 
into categories. Two of the categories were: services that must be continued 
based on certain constitutional mandates and federal law, with the caveat 
that agencies will consult their assigtted Assistant Attorney General for 
clarification; and services necessary for the immediate response to issues of 
public safety, or to avoid catastrophic loss of state property. Based on the 
contingency plans already developed, an injunction could be issued 
enjoining spending that does not fall into these two categories. 
15 
This could be done by issuing an injunction directed to the 
Governor. Under RCW 43.88.110(7), if "the governor projects a cash 
deficit in a particular fund or account as defined by RCW 43.88.050, the 
governor shall make across-the-board reductions in allotments for that 
particular fund or account so as to prevent a cash deficit[.]" Of course, 
RCW 43.88.050(7) would not apply directly to a writ issued by the Court. 
But it does identify the Governor as the appropriate official to enforce the 
Court's injunction. 
Cutting off special levy funds would bring pressure fi.-om parents and 
local school districts. Enjoining tax credits and exemptions would bring 
pressure from large and small ta:x,payers. Shutting down the State, except 
for essential service7 would seem to bring the most pressure to coerce the 
Legislature to comply with McCleary. 
5. The Court Could Enjoin The Operation Of The Public 
Schools 
One option that the respondents have argued for is shutting down 
the public schools. Plaintiff/Respondents' 2013 Post-Budget Filing at 46-
47, n. 1.41 (Sept. 30, 2013). The most relevant case· appears to be Robinson 
v. Cahill, 358 70 N.J. 155, 160, A.2d 457 (1976). In Robinson, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court issued an order that stated: "On and after July 1, 
1976, every public officer, state, county or municipal, is hereby enjoined 
16 
from expending any funds for the support of any free public school.~' 
Robinson; 70 N.J. at 160. The injunction did not apply to some expenditures 
such as the "payment of principal, interest and redemption of existing 
school bonds, anticipation notes and like obligations.'' I d. The order also 
provided that the injunction would not go into effect if''legislative action is 
taken providing 'for the funding of the 197 5 Act for the school year 197 6~ 
1977, effective July 1, 1976; or upon any other legislative action effective 
by that date providing for a system of financing the schools in compliance 
with the Education Clause of the Constitution/' Robinson, 70 N.J. at 161. 
Tlus order was issued on May 13, 1976. On July 91 1976~ the Court 
issued another order stating: 1'In view of the enactment oflegislation which 
will pennit full funding of the Public School Education Act of 1975, the 
injunction issued by this Court on May 13, 1976, ... is dissolved.', 
Robinson v. Cahill, 79 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976). Based on these two 
orders, it appears that closing the schools did coerce the Legislature in New 
Jersey to enact school funding that complied with the state constitution. 
The Superintendent has opposed closing the schools as a remedy for 
McCleary. See 2014 Amicus Br. at 4, n.l. Closing schools is harmful to 
the students~ and the other remedies suggested in this brief are more 
narrowly designed to put effective individual and political pressure on the 
Legislature -to addtess McCleary. However, given the apparent success of 
17 
the remedy in Robinson, closing the schools cannot be ruled out as a 
possible final remedy. 
If the Court chooses this remedy, it would enjoin the funding of the 
public schools. State funding of public schools is a two-step process. Under 
RCW 28A.510.250, the Superintendent apportions funds from the state 
general fund to the educational service districts, andl under RCW 
28A.510.260, the educational service districts apportion those funds to the 
school districts. Thus, the Court would issue an injunction prohibiting the 
Superintendent fi:om apportioning funds to the educational service districts. 
To cut off funding completely, the Court would also enjoin the county 
treasurers from paying out special levy proceeds to school districts. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The 2016 Legislature failed to address McCleary. The remedial 
penalty imposed by the Court is completely ineffective. To motivate the 
Legislature to seriously address the problem, the Court must impo.se tougher 
sanctions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of June 2016. 
WILLIAM B. COLLINS 
WSBA#785 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
3905 Lakehills Drive SE 
Olympia, WA 9850 I 
3 60~943" 7 534 
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